There is great concern at present that fish stocks are being depleted by over-fishing. Part of the problem of over-fishing is caused by the common property nature of the fishery resources. In particular, high seas fishery resources, such as highly migratory fish stocks (HMFS) and straddling fish stocks, suffer from over-fishing because one country does not take into account the detrimental effect that its harvest has on other fishing countries. Recently, the United Nations sponsored a conference to discuss the conservation and management of these fish stocks.
Introduction
There is great concern at present that fish stocks are being depicted by over-fishing. Part of the problem of over-fishing is caused by the common property nature of the fishery resources. In particular, high seas fishery resources such as highly migratory * We thank Sherry Larkin for her help in editing an earlier version of this paper. fish stocks and straddling fish stocks suffer from over-fishing because one country does not take into account the detrimental effect that its harvest has on other fishing countries. [1] This problem has brought conflicts between coastal states and distantwater fishing states. The United Nations has identified the importance of resolving this conflict by sponsoring a conference to discuss the conservation and management of these types of stocks. Despite the recognized importance, the existing literature lacks a formal treatment of this problem.
In this paper we construct a non cooperative game-theoretic model for the exploitation of a highly migratory fish stock (HMFS). It is a dynamic game between a single coastal state and several distant-water fishing (DWF) states. The model consists of two stages in each period; in the first stage the coastal state has exclusive first rights to harvest the fish stock, in the second stage, the DWF states simultaneously harvest the remaining fish stock (i.e., Stackelberg type oligopoly model). The model includes extraction costs that incorporate congestion (static) and stock (dynamic) externalities. The model is solved for a sub-game perfect equilibrium.
Using the model we examine how entrants into an HMFS fishery affect both the equilibrium harvest level and resource rents. The change in resource rents for any given number of fishing states is calculated by comparing equilibrium rents with rents earned in a cooperative fishery (i.e., one which maximizes the present value of rent). We show that entry into an HMFS fishery by a DWF state reduces total rents and increases the total equilibrium harvest level, harvest by the coastal state and the collective DWF states increases but the harvest levels of the individual DWF states is reduced. Further, we analyze bionomic equilibrium (Gordon [1954] ) of open-access in the second stage. We show that with a bionomic equilibrium, the resource rent is totally dissipated for DWF states, while the coastal state cams a positive resource rent. This result is in contrast with previous study using a Cournot oligopoly model, in which all resource rents are totally dissipated (Negri[1990] ).
In addition, we examine the effect of having an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on an HMFS fishery by comparing two types of oligopoly models, namely: Stackelberg and Cournot. We show that the current EEZ on an HMFS fishery benefits the coastal state and increases both the total equilibrium harvest and resource rent from the fishery. It is important to note, however, that this result contradicts the conventional view that total resource rent from commons increases by reducing total harvest level.
There are several previous Cournot models using closed-loop strategies for analyzing a fishery and other shared access resources.
[2]These models incorporate renewable (Fish) stock externality (Levhari and Mirman [1980] ) or nonrenewable stock and market externalities (Eswaran and Lewis [1984] ), and they are solved for a sub-game perfect equilibrium to show that Cournot type extraction leads to a socially inefficient outcome. The Cournot models are also used for demonstrating the difference between a open-loop and a closed-loop (sub-game perfect) solution and argue the relevance of the later solution concept (McMillan and Sinn [1980] , Eswaran and Lewis [1985] , and Reinganum and Stokey [1985] ). Negri [1990] incorporates extraction coasts into the Cournot oligopoly model and examines the effect of entry. In addition, the Cournot models are solved for a Markov perfect equilibrium to analyze the optimal number of firms in the commons (Karp [1992] , and Mason and Polasky [1996] ).
To introduce timing into the model, we utilize Stackelberg model instead of the Cournot model. There have been some previous attempts to use a Stackelberg model for common property resource issues (Levhari and Mirman [1980] and Kennedy [1987] ). Kennedy [1987] considers a similar problem to ours, in which one coastal state and one DWF state harvest a common HMFS (i.e., Stackelberg duopoly model). He did not solve for a sub-game perfect equilibrium, but instead performed a simulation that showed the total gains from an HMFS fishery are asymmetric for both states and socially inefficient. Recently, the Stackelberg model was used for analyzing an entry deterrent into a common properly resource (Mason and Polasky [1994] ). This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs a model of an HMFS fishery and solves the model for a sub-game perfect equilibrium. Section 3 analyzes the effect of entrants on the equilibrium harvest and resource rent. Section 4 derives a sub-game perfect equilibrium under a Cournot assumption. In section 5, the Stackelberg and Cournot oligopoly models are compared. Concluding remarks are presented in the last section.
The Stackelberg Model
Consider n+1 fishing states including one coastal state and n symmetric DWF states denoted as i= 1 and i= 2, 3, •••, n+1, respectively. Each state i has a decision-maker that chooses the harvest level ht i , in each period t; t= 1, 2. Let St be the fish stock available for harvest at the beginning of period t.
In each period, there are two stages. In the first stage, the coastal state faces a fish stock St within its EEZ and chooses harvest level ht 1 , and corresponding profit. In the second or last stage, the remaining stock migrates out of the coastal state's EEZ and into the adjacent high sea. The n symmetric DWF states observe the outcome of the first stage, ht 1 , and then simultaneously choose harvest level ht i (for i = 2, 3, ••, n+1). Since all n+1 states harvest fish from the common HMFS, the total fish harvest in t, Ht, is the sum of the harvest by all n+1 states:
where Ht -1 denotes the aggregate harvest by the n DWF states. The total fish harvest is non-negative and cannot exceed the fish stock level in the same period (0  Ht  St).
At the conclusion of period t, the remaining stock migrates back to the coastal state EEZ and period t+1 begins with the coastal state facing a stock size of St+1.. This new stock size includes both the stock remaining after harvesting in period f plus growth which occurs between period t and period t+1.
For simplicity we assume that stock growth is governed by a linear function. One way to think about the linear growth function is that it is an approximation of a logistic growth function in the range of low stock size (over-fishing) before density dependent effects have much influence. Hence, the fish dynamics between period 1 and period 2 is:
where r is the biological growth rate parameter (r > 0).
Further, we assume that the unit cost of harvesting fish depends on the harvest level and the size of the fish stock,  (Ht, St): increasing the harvest level increases costs ( () / Ht >0) while increasing the stock level reduces costs ( () / St < 0) 0). The former implies a congestion externality (static cost) and the latter implies a stock externality (dynamic cost). Hence, the cost of harvesting fish, C i t; can be written for the coastal state and for n DWF states, respectively as Where  is a cost parameter (>0).
The profit earned by state, from the fishery in period t,  i t, is the difference between the revenue and the cost in each period. The unit price of the harvested fish is assumed to be constant at P with 0 < P < a. The profits earned in period t by the coastal state and the n DWF states are, respectively:
All fishing states are assumed to have complete information, that is, the payoff functions (profits) are common knowledge.
To solve our two-period Stackelberg model for a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we use backwards induction and begin at the second stage in period 2 (i.e., the last stage of the game). If the second stage in period 2 is reached, the n DWF states face the following profit maximization problem:
With symmetry assumption of the n DWF states, we sum over the n identical firstorder conditions and solve for the optimal harvest level for each DWF state.
This equation is a best response or reaction function of each DWF state in period 2, it shows the optimal harvest level for state i (i = 2, 3, , n+1) given that the coastal state (n = I) chooses h2
.
At the first stage in period 2, the coastal state's problem is to Although the coastal state can anticipate the reactions of the n DWF states to its harvest level, h2, it does not consider their reactions because the unit cost for the coastal state does not depend on the harvest level by the DWF states. Solving the first-order condition of maximization problem in (7), the optimal harvest level for the coastal state in period 2 is simply Substituting this optima harvest level for the coastal state into the best response function of the DWF states defined in (6), the sub-game perfect outcome in period 2 is This sub-game perfect outcome is a feedback solution: it is a function of the state of the system in period 2 (i.e., S2). This outcome reflects a static optimization of a HMFS fishery. The coastal state chooses the harvest level which is half of P/ times the current stock size, S2.. Each DWF state chooses the harvest level equal to P/ times the remaining stock size, (1 -P/2) S2, divided by n+1.
Substituting the sub-game perfect outcome in (9) into both the objective function of the coastal state in (7) and that of the n DWF states in (5), the one-period optimal value function for the coastal state is:
The optimal value function V i t (St) is defined as the maximum value that can be obtained starting at time t in fish stock St.
Next, we consider the first period. Applying the method of backwards induction, the problem for the n DWF states at the second stage in period 1 can be written as where  is the discount factor (0 <   1). The first term on the right-hand-side of the equation is the current pay-off and the second term is the discounted oneperiod optimal value function in period 2. The latter term is fundamental to the use of dynamic programming. By including the latter term, the optimal decision by each DWF state takes into consideration the effect of harvest not only on current period (period 1) profit but also for the future period (period 2) profit.
We substitute the one-period optimal value function in (11) into the profit equations in (12) and further substitute the stock growth equation in (2). The optimization problem for the DWF states can be rewritten as where the size of HMFS in period 1, S1, is given exogenously. By summing over the n symmetric first-order conditions and solving for the optimal harvest level for the DWF states in period 1, we obtain the best response function of the n DWF states in period 1:
This equation indicates the optimal harvest level for state i, corresponding to each harvest level that the coastal state might take in period 1.
At the first stage in period 1, the coastal state's problem is We substitute the optimal value function of the coastal state in (10) and the second-period fish dynamics in (2) into (15), and further substitute the best response function of the n DWF stales in (14) for the harvest of n DWF states in total harvest in period 1. That is, by the assumption of complete information the coastal state can solve the problem of the n DWF states so that the coastal state can anticipate the best response of the DWF states . The optimization problem for the coastal state becomes:
Solving the first-order condition gives the optimal harvest level for the coastal state in period 1: where Substituting this solution into the best response function of n DWF states in (14), the sub-game perfect outcome in period 1 is derived as This sub-game perfect outcome shows dynamic optimization of the HMFS fishery. The coastal state chooses a harvest level which is slightly less than the static optimal level (equation (9) times ) and each DWF also chooses a harvest level such that the ratio of a harvest to a remaining fish stock is slightly less than that in the static case (.P/(n+1)P/(n+1) )
For the coastal state, the dynamic optimal harvest level is less than the static level because there is an additional user cost such that the harvest cost for the coastal state is higher in the dynamic case. Hence, increased conservation by the coastal state in the initial period increases the stock size available in the next period due to the growth function. For the DWF states, however, whether harvest is less than the static level is ambiguous. Although the user cost reduces the harvest ratio of harvest to the remaining fish stock, the remaining stock in dynamic case is larger than that in static case (1-P/2) which might offset the reduction in the harvest ratio.
To obtain the two-period optimal value functions, we substitute the sub-game perfect outcome in (18) into both the objective function for the coastal state in (16) and the objective function for the n DWF states in (13). The following value functions are obtained for the coastal state, In the brackets in both solutions, the first and second term show the parts of resource rents from period 1, and the third and last term present the parts of resource rents from period 2, which is discounted by  (the third term, in particular, is generated by the fish growth).
The effect of DWF entry
Entry into an HMFS fishery by a DWF state affects optimal harvest levels and resource rents generated by both the coastal state and DWF states. To examine this issue, we analyze both the short and long term effects of increasing the number of DWF states.
A .The short-run effect of entry
Using the solution to the two-period Stackelberg model developed in the previous section, the partial derivatives of the equilibrium harvest levels for the coastal state, each DWF state, and the collective DWF states (H This result is explained by stock and congestion externalities (dynamic and static cost, respectively). Given the equilibrium harvest for each DWF state, the entry increases the total harvest by the collective DWF states (i.e., (n+1) h i* 1> n h i* 1). This larger harvest in the first period reduces the stock size in the second period; this produces a stock externality. For the coastal state, larger harvests by DWF states mean fewer fish will survive to the second period. Therefore, there is less value for the coastal state to conserve the stock for second period; consequently, the coastal state increases its harvest level in the first period.
For the DWF states, the result is reversed. While the increased harvest level of the collective DWF states also reduces their marginal user cost (i.e., the stock externality), it increases their marginal harvesting cost in both periods; this is the congestion externality. As a result, the total marginal cost increases. Because the total marginal cost has increased, the individual DWF states reduce their harvest level.
We next examine the effect of an entrant on the two-period optimal value functions for the coastal state and DWF states. Recall that these functions consist of the first period pay-off and the discounted second period optimal value function. Partial derivatives of these two-period optimal value functions with respect to the parameter n are:
The following proposition therefore holds. Recall that in the second period the discounted optimal value function is positively related to the stock size (equations (10) and (11)). Using Proposition 1, DWF entry in the first period lowers the resource rent for the coastal state (as the stock size in period two is reduced). For the individual DWF states, entry also increases the harvesting cost for each DWF state; this is the congestion externality. The DWF states encounter both stock and congestion externalities and, therefore, their individual resource rents decline.
B. The long-run effect of entry
Next we analyze the open-access bionomic equilibrium (Gordon [1954] ). If DWF states earn positive profit (i.e., have positive optimal value functions), then additional DWF states are attracted to the fishery. Entry will continue until the fishery reaches a bionomic equilibrium in which all operating DWF states have zero profit (i.e., their optimal value functions are zero) such that resource rent is totally dissipated.
In our model, the bionomic equilibrium occurs when the number of DWF states goes to infinity. The bionomic equilibrium harvest level by the collective DWF states is determined by multiplying number of DWF states, n, with the best response functions (for each period, equations (6) and (14)) and taking the limit on the number of DWF stales: This is exactly the zero profit condition (using profit equation (4)): Note that if the price and the cost parameter are equivalent in the bionomic equilibrium, the DWF states will harvest all the remaining stock in the first period (i.e., no fish in period 2).
By taking the limit on the number of DWF states, n, for the two-period value functions in (19) and (20), the two-period optimal value in the bionomic equilibrium for the coastal state is:
These results provide the following proposition.
Proposition 3: Under a bionomic open-access equilibrium in a HMFS fishery, the coastal state earns a positive resource rent but the resource rent for the DWF states is totally dissipated.
The rent earned by the coastal state is not totally dissipated by the number of DWF states because the coastal state (1) has exclusive right to harvest the fish stock prior to DWF states and (2) its harvesting cost is independent of DWF activity. The coastal state always earns a positive resource rent in the first period. The coastal state will earn additional rent in the second period if fish price is less than the cost parameter (P < ). This is because in bionomic equilibrium, DWF states will not harvest all of the remaining stock in the first period if fish price is less than the cost parameter.
The Cournot Model
We use a Cournot model to represent an HMFS fishery without an EEZ. This type of model has been previously developed to study common property resources in which fishing states simultaneously harvest the fish stock. [3] In particular, we use a two-period Cournot model and solve for a sub-game perfect equilibrium in order to compare results with the Stackelberg model and entry effects presented in Sections 2 and 3. Unless otherwise specified, symbols retain their original definition.
A. The solutions for a Cournot model
Consider +1 symmetric fishing states denoted as j = 1, 2,…, n+1. Each state j has a decision-maker that chooses the harvest level h j t in each period t; t=1,2. In each period, there is only one stage (one can regard an HMFS as a non-migratory fish stock because the all fishing states can freely move according to an HMFS). the Cournot game begins as follows. In the first period, the states face a fish stock and simultaneously choose harvest level h j t and determine their profit. At the beginning of the second period, the states face stock size St+1 which includes both the stock remaining after harvesting in period t plus growth which occurs between period t and period t+1. Since all j states harvest fish from the common HMFS, the total fish harvest in period t, Ht, is the sum of the harvest by all n+1states.
This Cournot model differs from the Stackelberg model described in Section 2 in that the cost of harvesting depends on the size of the fish stock and the total harvest by all n+1 states. The cost of harvesting fish for each symmetric state, C j t, is, therefore, written as and the profit earned by each state j from the fishery in period t is (we keep assumption of a constant price P with 0 < P  .)
Using backwards induction to solve our two-period Cournot model for a sub-game perfect equilibrium, the n+1 fishing states face the following profit maximization problem in second period:
With symmetry assumption for the n+1 states, we sum over the n+1 identical firstorder conditions and solve for the optimal harvest level of all fishing states:
Dividing the equation by n+1, the optimal harvest level for each state j is This equation shows the sub-game perfect equilibrium for each state in period 2. It is a feedback solution. It is a function of the state of the system in period 2 (i.e., -S2). This equilibrium reflects the static optimization of a HMFS fishery without an EEZ. Each state chooses the harvest level equal to P/ times the current stock size, S2, divided by n+2.
Substituting the sub-game perfect equilibrium in (26) and the aggregated equilibrium harvest of all states in (25) into the objective function in (24), the oneperiod optimal value function for each state is:
Given the second period solutions, we can derive the problem for each state in period 1:
Substituting the one-period optimal value function in (27) and the stock growth equation in (2) into equation (28), the optimization problem for the each fishing state can be rewritten as By summing over n+1 symmetric first-order conditions, we solve for the optimal harvest level for the collective fishing states in period 1:
Dividing the equation by n+1 gives the optimal harvest level for each state in period 1: This is the sub-game perfect equilibrium for the n+1 states in period 1. This equation shows dynamic optimization of an HMFS fishery without an EEZ. Each state chooses a harvest level which is slightly less than the static optimal level (equation (26) 
times ).
Using the objective function in (29), the two-period optimal value function for each state is found by substituting in the sub-game perfect equilibrium harvest levels of the individual and collective states (equations (31) and (30), respectively):
In the bracket, the first and second term show the parts of resource rents from period 1, and the third and last term present the parts from period 2, which is discounted by .
B. The effect of entry in a Cournot model
As we have analyzed in Section 3, we can also show the effect of entry. Partial derivatives of the equilibrium harvest level for (1) each fishing state, (2) the collective states, and (3) the value function with respect to parameter n are, respectively:
Taking the limit on optimal value function gives the bionomic equilibrium level:
Identical results were found in several previous studies of common property resources; an increase in the number of fishing states, n, reduces both the equilibrium harvest level of each state and the resource rent from the fishery. As we found in Section 3, entry affects the fishing cost through both stock and congestion externalities. The stock externality decreases the user cost by reducing stock size in the second period, conversely, the congestion externality increases the harvesting cost in each period. In total, the net harvesting costs increase which reduce the harvest levels of the individual states. Entry and the corresponding externalities, therefore, reduce the resource rent for all fishing states by reducing profits in both periods. In addition, without an EEZ, open-access promotes entry which totally dissipates the resource rent (as each state earns zero economic profit) in bionomic equilibrium.
The EEZ assumption
To examine whether the existence of an EEZ (which is currently defined at 200 miles) affects the equilibrium harvest level and resource rent(s) generated from an HMFS fishery, we compare the Stackelberg and Cournot solutions. Recall that the Stackelberg model represents an HMFS fishery with an EEZ (i.e., one coastal and several DWF states) and the Cournot model represents an HMFS fishery without an EEZ (i.e., several symmetric states).
A. The individual harvest and resource rent
By comparing the individual equilibrium harvest level for the coastal state (denoted as 1) and the DWF states (denoted as i) in the Stackelberg model with those for individual fishing states (denoted as j) in the Cournot model, the following relationships are obtained:
where the subscripts S and C denote the solutions for the Stackelberg and Cournot model, respectively. Similarly, comparing the two-period optimal value functions gives:
These results yield the next proposition.
Proposition 4: The coastal state in the Stackelberg model harvests more and earns a higher rent than the DWF states (whose harvests occur after the coastal state) or Cournot state, however, the relative position of the harvest level and corresponding rent for the DWF states and the Cournot state is ambiguous.
These results suggest that the current EEZ on an HMFS fishery allows the coastal state to have a higher resource rent by increasing its harvest level. This is the general result of a Stackelberg game with quantity competition; under the assumption of strategic substitution (i.e., each player's reaction is a decreasing function of its opponent's output) the leader can benefit from a commitment which allows it a first-mover advantage over the followers. In our model, with an EEZ (i.e., a commitment), the coastal state (i.e., the leader) has the exclusive right to harvest the fish stock prior to DWF states (i.e., the followers) and, therefore, the coastal state knows each DWF states' best response function (which is inversely related to the coastal states harvest level). Hence, the coastal state will maximize rent by increasing its harvest level in order to reduce harvests by the DWF states.
To explain the ambiguous result in Proposition 4, the most easiest way is to consider the static level of equilibrium harvests (i.e., in period 2) for the DWF states and the Cournot states. Subtracting the former level in equation (9) from the latter level in equation (26) gives:
The right-hand side of the equation shows that the difference is positive when 2/(n+2) < P/  1, is zero when P/ = 2/(n+2) and is negative when 0 < P/ < 2/(n+2) (note that, 0 < 2/(n+2)  2/3 since 1 n <,). This is because, as the middle part of the equation shows, by a congestion externality, the equilibrium harvest level for DWF states is tend to be higher than that for the Cournot states (1/(n+l) > l/ (n+2)); however, by a stock externality, the former level is tend to be lower than the latter level (P/ ( 1-P/2.) < P/).
In particular, when 2/(n+2) < P/a . 1, the equilibrium harvest level for DWF states is lower than that for the Cournot states (in this case, the equilibrium harvest level for the coastal state is relatively large and, consequently, the remaining stock level is small). When 0 < P/a < 2/(n+2), this result is reversed and when P/a = 2/(n+2), the both harvest levels are equivalent. For the case of dynamic level of the equilibrium harvest (i.e., in period 1), the basic argument does not change. Also, the ambiguous result for resource rents can be explained by the same reasoning as the case of harvest level.
B. The total harvest and resource rent
To compare the total harvest level and total resource rent with and without an EEZ (i.e., the Stackelberg and Cournot models, respectively), we sum the relevant solution values for the n+1 fishing states. We also compare these total harvest and resource rent levels with the socially optimal levels (i.e., the sole owner, cooperative fishery).
By summing up all sub-game perfect outcome in (18), the total equilibrium harvest level for the Stackelberg model is:
Adding the two-period optimal value function for the coastal state in (19) with that for DWF states in (20) times n, the total resource rent for the Stackelberg model is:
The total equilibrium harvest level for the Cournot model is already derived in (30) as By multiplying n+1 to the two-period optimal value function in (32), the total resource rent for the Cournot model is:
By multiplying n+1 to the two-period optimal value function in (32), the total resource rent for the Cournot model is:
The socially optimal harvest level and resource rent are obtained by a sole owner (or a cooperative fishery). In an HMFS fishery, the sole owner, to maximize the profit, harvests the fish stock at only the first stage in period 1, but harvests at both the first and second stage in period 2 (since in the last period, the sole owner does not consider the next period). In period 2, the solutions for the sole owner are exactly the same as the ones in Stackelberg model (equations (9), (10), and (11)). In period 1, however, the sole owner faces the following profit maximization problem:
where a hat denotes the sole owner and V 2* 2 (S2) is the one-period optimal value function by one DWF state in period 2 (i.e., n = 1).
Substituting the one-period optimal value functions in (10) and (11), and the stock growth equation in (2) into (37), the optimization problem for the sole owner can be rewritten as Solving the first-order condition gives the optimal harvest level for the sole owner in period 1:
Substituting this solution into the objective function of the sole owner in (38), the one-period optimal value function for the sole owner (socially optimal resource rent) is:
Comparing the three total harvest levels (for the Stackelberg model in (33), the Cournot model in (35), and the sole owner in (39)) gives: H < Hc < Hs, and the following proposition.
Proposition 5: The total equilibrium harvest level in Stackelberg model is greater than that in Cournot model and both are greater than the socially optimal harvest level.
Also, comparing the total resource rents for the Stackelberg model in (34), the Cournot model in (36), and the sole owner in (40) gives: Vc < Vs < V, from which we get the following proposition. This result suggests that an EEZ yields higher resource rent even if the fish are highly migratory (although the resource rent is lower than the socially optimal level). As Proposition 5 indicates, however, the EEZ produces a higher total harvest level which could promote over-fishing.
In our analysis, under an EEZ, the coastal state increases its harvest level to earn a larger resource rent while DWF states reduce their harvest level and, therefore, earn lower rents. The increased harvest by the coastal state occurs because its harvesting cost excludes a congestion externality, while the decline for the DWF states occurs because their harvesting costs include a stock externality. In our model, the effect of the congestion externality is much greater than that of the stock externality, hence, increasing the size of the harvest level and resource rent for the coastal state exceeds the declining size of those for the collective DWF states. As a result, both the total harvest level and total resource rent increase.
Concluding remarks
This paper developed a two-period dynamic game model for examining an HMFS fishery. The model contains two stages in each period, in which the coastal state harvests the fish stock prior to any DWF states. We solved the model for a subgame perfect equilibrium and derived equilibrium harvest levels and resource rents. We used the results to examine the effects of (1) DWF entry and (2) the EEZ assumption.
In short-run, entry into an HMFS fishery reduces total resource rents and increases the total equilibrium harvest level; harvest by the coastal state and the collective DWFs increases, but the harvest level of the individual DWFs is reduced. In the long-run, in bionomic equilibrium, the coastal state earns a positive resource rent but the rents for the DWF states is totally dissipated if DWF entry occurs. This result contradicts previous studies of common property resources by using the Cournot model which find that all resource rents are totally dissipated (Negri [1990] ).
The existence of an EEZ benefits the coastal state in an HMFS fishery. In the view of total welfare, the EEZ results in a higher total resource rent by increasing the total harvest level. This result is also in contrast with the conventional view that total resource rent increases when the total harvest level is reduced. Our result is contradictory because of differences in the assumed strategic behavior and cost structure between the coastal state and the DWF states.
In addition, we found (as expected) that the socially optimal solution, which results from cooperative management, produced the highest rent and lowest harvest level as compared to the non-cooperative games.
